For most of the last eighty years, Australia has organised its foreign policy around one idea: find a great and powerful friend, and stay close to it. Britain first, then the United States. That strategy worked reasonably well in a world with one dominant power holding the rules together. It is being tested now that the world doesn't have one.
Why this matters right now
China's economic and military weight in the Indo-Pacific has grown enormously over the past two decades, while the reliability of the US alliance — long the fixed point in Australian strategic planning — is being openly questioned by Australian policy analysts themselves, particularly since the second Trump administration began reviewing the AUKUS submarine pact for fit with an "America First" agenda. Australia has responded by doubling down rather than hedging: deepening AUKUS, investing heavily in the Quad (with the US, Japan and India), and expanding defence spending. Critics argue this bets everything on a single relationship at the exact moment that relationship looks less certain; supporters argue it's the only realistic way for a mid-sized economy to matter in a region increasingly shaped by two much larger powers.
Underneath the alliance question sits a harder one: Australia's biggest trading partner and its most important security partner are increasingly rivals. That contradiction doesn't resolve itself, and every year of postponement narrows the range of comfortable choices available.
The central tensions
- Alliance dependence vs strategic autonomy. Is Australia a middle power exercising real agency, or a "deterrence taker" whose choices are made in Washington?
- Economic ties vs security alignment. Can Australia keep deep trade with China while deepening military integration with the US, or is that balance running out of road?
- Regional identity vs Anglosphere identity. Does leaning harder into AUKUS strengthen Australia's standing with South-East Asian and Pacific neighbours, or does it reinforce a perception of Australia as an outpost of an English-speaking alliance system rather than a genuine partner in the Indo-Pacific?
- Investment now vs flexibility later. AUKUS submarines won't arrive for years, and their delivery already depends on US production capacity that may not stretch to Australia's needs. What does Australia do if the centrepiece of its defence strategy doesn't turn up on schedule?
Questions to bring to the discourse
- If the AUKUS submarine timeline slips further, what should Australia's fallback posture look like?
- Should Australia be investing more in relationships with ASEAN and Pacific nations as a hedge, rather than as a complement, to the US alliance?
- What would genuine strategic autonomy actually cost — in dollars, in diplomatic capital, and in risk?
- Is "middle power" still an honest description of Australia's role, or is it a comfortable label that avoids harder choices?
In one sentence
Australia built its security around having one great and powerful friend in a one-power world — the question for this discourse is what replaces that strategy now that the world has at least two.